(杨光斌)
____________________________________
* Yang Guangbin (杨光斌),“HOW TO UNDERSTAND GREAT CHANGES UNSEEN
IN A CENTURY”
https://www.strategictranslation.org/articles/how-to-understand-the-great-changes-unseen-in-a-century
How to Understand the ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century'
如何理解‘百年未有之大变局'
Author Yang Guangbin 杨光斌
original publication Asia Pacific Security and
Maritime Affairs 《亚太安全与海洋研究》
publication date March 3, 2019
Translator Samuel George
Translation date November 2022
Introduction
Note: The following translation is one of six entries in a roundtable discussion convened by two state think tanks in the spring of 2019. Participants were all eminent Chinese academics. Their task was to analyze the slogan “Great Changes Unseen in a Century.” A general introduction to the seminar and the slogan it discusses can be found here.
Wealth brings both power and peril. So argues Yang Guangbin, Dean of the School of International Relations at Renmin University and member of numerous expert advisory groups at the intersection of Chinese academia and the communist party-state. Yang has spent his career trying to dethrone Western theories of international relations and political development, especially those that might undermine the legitimacy of party leadership over China. His attacks on liberal theory oscillate between two seemingly irreconcilable standpoints: the thoroughly materialist worldview of a critic steeped in the Marxist classics, and the cultural essentialism of a thinker who takes civilizations, not states or social classes, as the main unit of his analysis.¹ Both of these approaches inform his discussion of “Great Changes Unseen in a Century.”
Yang posits that the rising wealth of the non-Western world is the most important development of the 21st century, a development best explored through industrial statistics. By 2050, Yang notes, industrial production in the non-Western world will exceed that of the West. This reversal constitutes the basis of the “Great Changes Unseen in a Century.”
Yang assesses this development from two perspectives. The failure of the Western order is not just a matter of dynamism in the developing world—the old capitalist powers made specific choices that led them to their present failures. “In the process of industrialization,” Yang argues, “each and every country experiences a keen contradiction between social classes.” Some countries deal with these contradictions by exporting their underclass away through emigration; others deal with them through imperialistic conquest. Historical study suggests that with imperial hegemons "the common rule is that [their] industrial economy moves from real to intangible,” as the financial sector swallows the larger economy and manufacturing is relegated to lesser parts of the imperial world system. The 2008 Financial Crisis revealed just how far down this path the American economy had traveled. Now the United States (and the rest of the Western world with it) can no longer ignore class contradictions intrinsic to their system, for they are expressed in debilitating waves of ethno-nationalism on the one hand, and waves of left-wing populism on the other. The largest casualty in this collapse has been “the power of liberal democracy to rally supporters,” both in the West and outside it.
Yang recognizes that China will soon face the dangerous contradictions of industrial wealth itself, but he is “cautiously optimistic” that China will surmount these difficulties. Yang does not focus on this theme: adding China to the story allows Yang to shift his frame from class contradictions to civilizational conflict. Yang insists that China is not just another capitalist power clamoring for its turn at hegemony over the “Westphalian system of nation states,” but the “core state” of its own “civilizational system.” China’s rise is thus the most important event of the last five centuries. America’s internal contradictions are capable of undermining its leadership of the existing world order; China’s rise “may potentially contribute to the reshaping of the world order” writ large.
Yang does not view this as a clear victory for the Chinese people. Rather, “the great changes” of our era mean that in the realm of international affairs “there is no unifying ideology. Universal values have failed.” Liberal ideals were held up only through liberal power; with the collapse of that power, Yang predicts that the liberal international order of the past will be replaced by a “no man’s land.”
For a party that treats liberal ideas as a mortal danger, this is a tolerable, if not ideal, state of affairs. Yang does not imagine it will be a permanent one. He concludes that “whoever first extricates themselves from ‘no man’s land’ will go on to lead this world.” Yang clearly hopes China will be the ‘first to leave no man’s land,’ but he offers no thoughts on how China might do so. Like many Chinese intellectuals, Yang Guangbin finds it easier to critique the present world order than envision its future.²
—THE EDITORS
https://txtify.it/https://www.strategictranslation.org/articles/how-to-understand-the-great-changes-unseen-in-a-century
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE ‘GREAT CHANGES UNSEEN IN A CENTURY' | THE
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC TRANSLATION
The present [essay] discusses three questions regarding the “Great
Changes Unseen in a Century.”
1. AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS - THE [GLOBAL] SHIFT OF
WEALTH AND POWER.³
At the beginning of the second industrial revolution in 1840, Western
and non-Western nations each accounted for 50% of industrially
manufactured goods. At that time, even though China and India were
very backward, non-Western countries such as these still accounted for
half of the world’s industrially manufactured goods. By 1980,
Western nations supplied 90% of all industrially manufactured goods,
while non-Western countries, including China and India, accounted for
10%. By 2010, non-Western nations, including India, had become the
greatest beneficiaries of globalization and the free flow of capital.
China in particular was an unexpectedly big winner out of this
process. As of 2010, Western nations accounted for 60% of manufactured
goods and non-Western countries accounted for 40%. By 2050 – or
perhaps even earlier – these [relative] proportions may be reversed,
with non-Western countries accounting for 60% and Western countries
for 40%. This transfer of wealth and power [away from Western nations]
is advantageous to non-Western nations [such as China].
Wealth and power are concepts of major significance. In the course of
their development, Western nations used a strategy of “one step in,
one step out” to resolve their domestic contradictions. Class
contradiction is both an old concept and a reality. In the process of
industrialization, each and every country experiences a keen
contradiction between social classes. What methods can resolve this
contradiction? To “step in” refers to the use of strategic
pillaging to resolve this problem – [for example], in 1905 Japan and
Russia went head-to-head in war.⁴
What does “step out” refer to? People who can no longer make ends
meet have the option to emigrate. In the 200 years between 1800 and
2000, over 80% of the population of Edinburgh emigrated, leaving less
than 15% of the [original] local population – over 85% of people
upped and left. In the 20 year period from 1900 to 1920, approximately
6 million people – that is, around 20% of Italy’s population of 30
million – emigrated elsewhere, creating [the conditions for the rise
of] Fascism under Mussolini.⁵
The present shift of wealth and power proves the general rule that
hegemonic nations [are bound to] decline. From [the historical
experience of] the Spanish [Empire], to the British[Empire], and now
to the United States, the common rule is that the industrial economy
moves from real to intangible; for example, the Spanish Empire’s
adoption of “silver capitalism” brought about the decline of its
manual industry and the rise of neighboring countries, such as France
and Germany.⁶ At the end of the 19th century, the British Empire
essentially ceded [its domination] of [global] industry to the United
States and Germany. This is [a case of] a shift in wealth
precipitating the decline of a hegemon, a process that cannot be
reversed.
2. CHANGES IN CULTURAL POWER BROUGHT ABOUT BY SHIFTS IN WEALTH
Why did Western nations flourish after the Second World War? Among the
ideological explanations for this are those meant to legitimize
liberal democracy as a political ideology. We can observe the scenario
when wealth and power are absent – this is what has transpired since
the shift in wealth and power that followed 2008 [the global financial
crisis].⁷ Be it in Europe, the U.S. or non-Western nations the
power of liberal democracy to rally supporters has abated.
Newly apparent is the spontaneous resurgence of [two] ideologies: one
is ethno-nationalism, the other is populism. These two phenomena have
not been constructed [deliberately], but have burst forth naturally,
appearing in response to changes in the environment. The term
ethno-nationalism describes a political nation that takes race as its
primary unit. In 16th century Europe, if you asked someone what type
of person they are, they would not say French or German. They would
say Protestant or Catholic – which reflects a religious frame of
reference. Today, following the decline of politicized ideology,⁸
The original ideological ecology has begun to revive. [Resurgent]
ethno-nationalism is rousing a great rabble. The other [resurgent
ideology] is populism, which in its left-wing form is equivalent to
socialism, and in its right-wing form is effectively
ethno-nationalism.
Therefore, world politics has suddenly taken on a drastically
different appearance. There is [now] no unifying ideology. Universal
values have failed. [Their failure] gives rise to an era in which
diverse [political] cultures co-exist side-by-side. There are two
phenomena here: one is a material, the other is cultural.
WHERE GOES THE WORLD?
To summarize my present answer to this question: “no man’s
land.” Those [of us] who study politics maintain a cautiously
optimistic attitude towards China. We are aware of what our domestic
problems and domestic tensions are. For a fairly long time in the
future, the party and government must confront and resolve the dilemma
of settling the tension between power derived from wealth and power
derived from political authority. "If this problem is managed poorly,
there will be trouble. On the assumption that it is managed well, what
will the prospects be for China's future position on the world stage?
Let us cast aside the talk of domestic problems, as we [at this
gathering] are only discussing world politics. Some famous scholars,
such as Samuel Huntington, repeatedly use Lee Kuan Yew’s 1994
judgment that China is one of “history’s largest scale
participants” in their work.⁹ Pretending one can’t see the
significance of [China’s] scale is nonsensical. [China’s] arrival
raises many issues; [indeed], the arrival of “history’s largest
scale participant” may potentially contribute to the reordering of
the world order.
What is this world order? You can say it took 300 years or 500 years
to [take shape], or that our present world order took shape from 1700
onwards. As the world order took shape, there were many wars within
the West that arose because Western participants were vying for
predominance. This is the Westphalian system of nation states formed
in 1648; the present world order is [based on] this same
Western-dominated Westphalian system.¹⁰ It was once dominated by
Britain and now is [dominated] by the U.S.
Over the past 300 years of Western [history], Westerners have been
playing their own game [on their own terms]. Now China has arrived, a
first for a non-Western nation. From the perspective of “the clash
of civilizations,”¹¹ Islamic civilization does not have one core
civilizational state, so does not pose a major threat to Christian
[Western] civilization.¹² In this sense, we truly are facing
“great changes unseen in a century.” In this sense the 'century'
[of the slogan] does not [refer to] "great changes" that occur on a
100 year timescale, but rather on a 300 or 500 year timescale. On the
one hand, these are major changes in a civilizational sense; on
another level, they refer to a difference in institutions and systems,
that is, the difference between the institutions of capitalism and the
institutions of socialism.
One [aspect of the great changes unseen in a century] are found in
civilizational systems and the other is found in institutions. Now
that these [changes] have emerged, the present world order has entered
a “no man’s land.” We do not know where it will go onto. Whoever
can first extricate themselves from “no man’s land” will go on
to lead this world.
³ THE TRANSCRIPT OF YANG'S SPEECH USES THE TWO HOMONYMS, 权力 AND
权利, MEANING "POWER" AND "RIGHTS" RESPECTIVELY, IN SEEMINGLY
INCONSISTENT WAYS. THESE MAY BE A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR. THE TRANSLATOR
HAS USED CONTEXT TO GUIDE THE CHOICE OF TERM THROUGHOUT.
⁴ THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1904-1905 WAS FOUGHT BETWEEN THE
JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN EMPIRES TO SETTLE THEIR CONFLICTING IMPERIAL
AMBITIONS IN MANCHURIA AND KOREA; WITHOUT VICTORY IN THIS WAR, JAPAN
WOULD NEVER HAVE ESTABLISHED AN IMPERIAL PRESENCE IN NORTHWESTERN
CHINA. RUSSIA’S POOR PERFORMANCE AND ULTIMATE DEFEAT IN THE WAR ALSO
CONTRIBUTED TO THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF JANUARY 1905, AN
UPRISING OF THE WORKING CLASSES AGAINST THE TSAR AND THE NOBILITY THAT
WAS A PRELUDE TO THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION OF 1917. YANG MAY BE IMPLYING
THAT THE FAILURE OF RUSSIA’S “STEP IN” POLICY EXACERBATED ITS
SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS AND LED TO REVOLUTION.
⁵ AROUND THE TURN OF THE 19TH CENTURY, ITALIANS, ESPECIALLY IN THE
SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY, WERE FACING DIRE POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT. FROM
1901-1927, ITALY PURSUED A NATIONALIST POLICY OF EMIGRATION UNDER THE
_COMMISSARIATO GENERALE DELL’EMIGRAZION_E, GUIDED IN PART BY THE
BELIEF THAT THE PROBLEM OF ITALY’S UNEMPLOYABLE MASSES COULD BE
TRANSFORMED INTO A NATIONAL RESOURCE. YANG IMPLIES THAT THE RISE OF
THE FASCISTS UNDER MUSSOLINI – RATHER THAN THE RISE OF A SOCIALIST
PARTY – WAS AIDED BY THE EMIGRATION OF VAST NUMBERS OF THE WORKING
CLASS ITALIANS WHO MIGHT HAVE AGITATED FOR SOCIALIST REFORM.
⁶ DURING THE AGE OF DISCOVERY, THE SPANISH EMPIRE ACQUIRED VAST
AMOUNTS OF SILVER FROM ITS NEW WORLD COLONIES IN AMERICA, NOTABLY THE
VICEROYALTY OF PERU AND THE VICEROYALTY OF NEW SPAIN. THE LARGE
INCREASE IN THE SUPPLY OF PRECIOUS METALS AS WELL AS THE SPANISH
EMPIRE’S MISJUDGED POLICIES CREATED PROBLEMS WITH INFLATION AND DEBT
THAT ULTIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECLINE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE.
YANG’S DESCRIPTION OF FINANCIALIZATION AS PRELUDE TO DECLINE YANG IS
NEITHER ORIGINAL NOR ESPECIALLY MARXIST. FOR BRIEF A LITERATURE REVIEW
OF THIS THESIS (WHICH WAS FIRST ARTICULATED BY AMERICAN HISTORIANS AT
THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY), COMPLETE WITH DISCUSSION OF IMPERIAL
SPAIN AND BRITAIN, SEE KEVIN PHILLIPS, _WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH_ (NEW YORK: CROWN, 2003), PP.
171-2003.
⁷ CHINESE ANALYSTS HAVE REFERRED TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AS THE
BEGINNING OF THE END OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY FOR MORE THAN DECADE. FOR A
PARTICULARLY INFLUENTIAL EXAMPLE, SEE THIS 2009 ESSAY BY YUAN PENG,
NOW PRESIDENT OF CHINA INSTITUTES OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (CICIR), THE THINK-TANK LINKED TO THE MINISTRY OF STATE
SECURITY: 袁鹏 [YUAN PENG],
“金融危机与美国经济霸权：历史与政治的解读”
[“THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND AMERICAN HEGEMONY: INTERPRETING THE
HISTORY AND POLITICS],” 《更新时间》[_RENEWAL TIMES_],
AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.AISIXIANG.COM/DATA/88470.HTML.
⁸ THE IMPLICATION HERE IS THAT THE NORMS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY,
UNLIKE THE MORE ‘NATURAL’ ALTERNATIVES LIKE POPULISM AND
NATIONALISM, ARE AN ARTIFICIAL CONSTRUCT PROMOTED BY THE WEST AND
IMPOSED ON OTHER SOCIETIES SOLELY TO LEGITIMIZE ITS HEGEMONIC POWER.
YANG HAS STATED THIS BELIEF MORE EXPLICITLY IN OTHER PIECES. IN MAY OF
2022 HE ARGUED THAT THE FINANCIAL COST OF RELYING ON “HARD POWER”
TO MAINTAIN HEGEMONY
_IS TOO HIGH FOR A HEGEMON [LIKE THE UNITED STATES], SO IT MUST
SUPPLEMENT IT WITH “SOFT POWER.” …[BUT] THE RULE OF LAW, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE SACROSANCT INVIOLABILITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY ARE [IN
REALITY] JUST A THIN VEIL THAT THEY DRAPED OVER [THEIR DEEDS] AFTER
THE UNITED STATES HAD ALREADY DEVELOPED. AMERICA’S DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS WAS FULL OF SLAUGHTER AND ROBBERY. FOR THE INDIANS WHO DIED IN
GENOCIDE, WHERE WAS THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS? WHERE WAS THE
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WHEN THE FORCES OF THE EIGHT-POWER
ALLIANCE LOOTED YUANMINGYUAN?_
霸权国只靠“硬实力”是维持不了霸权的，代价也太大，必须辅助于“软实力”…美国的“软实力”被打回原形，什么法治、人权、私有财产神圣不可侵犯，都是在其发达起来以后挂起来的一层薄薄面纱，其发展过程充满了杀戮、抢劫的强盗行为，对印第安人的种族灭绝哪里有什么法治和人权，八国联军抢掠圆明园哪里讲什么保护财产权?
杨光斌 [YANG GUANGBIN],
俄罗斯人的世纪抗争路与世界秩序的重组 [“THE
RUSSIAN’S CENTURY LONG PATH OF STRUGGLE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF
WORLD ORDER”], 观察 [_GUANCHA.CN_], 2022年05月01日 [5 MAY
2022], AVAILABLE HERE.
⁹ YANG IS LIKELY REFERRING TO LEE KUAN YEW’S FAMOUS INTERVIEW WITH
FAREED ZAKARIA, PUBLISHED IN THE MARCH-APRIL 1994 EDITION OF _FOREIGN
AFFAIRS_, IN WHICH LEE ASKS WHETHER THE WORLD CAN ACCOMMODATE “A
COUNTRY THE SIZE OF CHINA” INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND STABILITY. SEE FAREED ZAKARIA, “CULTURE IS DESTINY - A
CONVERSATION WITH LEE KUAN YEW,” _FOREIGN AFFAIRS, _MAR/APR 1994, P.
122.
¹⁰ THE WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM, TRACED BACK TO THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA
IN 1648 THAT ENDED A CATASTROPHIC PERIOD OF WAR WITHIN EUROPE, IS
TYPICALLY USED BY CHINESE THINKERS AS SHORT-HAND FOR THE WESTERN-LED
WORLD ORDER THAT BENEFITS WESTERN INTERESTS. THE WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM IS
COMMONLY CREDITED FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND
NON-INTERFERENCE THAT CHINA USES RHETORICALLY TO CONTEST U.S. AND
WESTERN POWER POLITICS AND INTERVENTIONISM.
¹¹ YANG TAKES SERIOUSLY THE “CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” THESIS
FIRST PUBLISHED BY SAMUEL HUNTINGTON IN THE SUMMER 1993 ISSUE OF
_FOREIGN AFFAIRS._ HUNTINGTON OBSERVED A SHIFT IN POWER AWAY FROM THE
WEST AND PREDICTED COMING CIVILIZATIONAL CHALLENGES FROM THE ISLAMIC
CIVILIZATION, UNIFIED BY RELIGION, AND THE CONFUCIAN CIVILIZATION,
CENTERED ON CHINA AND UNIFIED BY COMMON CULTURAL ROOTS. IN THE
AUTHOR’S VIEW, THEN, THE “CHANGES UNSEEN IN A CENTURY” INVOLVE
NOT ONLY RISING GLOBAL WEALTH, BUT A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS BROUGHT
ABOUT BY A RISING CHINA.
¹² IN HUNTINGTON’S PIECE, THE CATEGORY OF “WESTERN
CIVILIZATION” IS BASED ON THE OLDER CATEGORY OF “WESTERN
CHRISTIANITY”—IN ESSENCE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ITS REFORMATION
OFFSHOOTS. REGIONS WHERE THESE RELIGIONS WERE HISTORICALLY THE MOST
IMPORTANT COMPRISE HUNTINGTON’S “WEST.” ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY IS
CONSIDERED TO BE THE BASIS FOR A DIFFERENT CIVILIZATION.
YANG DESCRIBES THIS CIVILIZATION WITH THE TERM 基督教, WHICH IS
GENERALLY USED ONLY FOR PROTESTANTS (WITH 天主教 REFERRING TO
CATHOLICS). HOWEVER, IN THE CONTEXT OF HUNTINGTON’S PIECE, 基督教
MAPS ONTO THE “CHRISTIANITY” ASSOCIATED WITH WESTERN CIVILIZATION.
____________________________________
* Yang Guangbin (杨光斌),“HOW TO UNDERSTAND GREAT CHANGES UNSEEN
IN A CENTURY”
https://www.strategictranslation.org/articles/how-to-understand-the-great-changes-unseen-in-a-century
How to Understand the ‘Great Changes Unseen in a Century'
如何理解‘百年未有之大变局'
Author Yang Guangbin 杨光斌
original publication Asia Pacific Security and
Maritime Affairs 《亚太安全与海洋研究》
publication date March 3, 2019
Translator Samuel George
Translation date November 2022
Introduction
Note: The following translation is one of six entries in a roundtable discussion convened by two state think tanks in the spring of 2019. Participants were all eminent Chinese academics. Their task was to analyze the slogan “Great Changes Unseen in a Century.” A general introduction to the seminar and the slogan it discusses can be found here.
Wealth brings both power and peril. So argues Yang Guangbin, Dean of the School of International Relations at Renmin University and member of numerous expert advisory groups at the intersection of Chinese academia and the communist party-state. Yang has spent his career trying to dethrone Western theories of international relations and political development, especially those that might undermine the legitimacy of party leadership over China. His attacks on liberal theory oscillate between two seemingly irreconcilable standpoints: the thoroughly materialist worldview of a critic steeped in the Marxist classics, and the cultural essentialism of a thinker who takes civilizations, not states or social classes, as the main unit of his analysis.¹ Both of these approaches inform his discussion of “Great Changes Unseen in a Century.”
Yang posits that the rising wealth of the non-Western world is the most important development of the 21st century, a development best explored through industrial statistics. By 2050, Yang notes, industrial production in the non-Western world will exceed that of the West. This reversal constitutes the basis of the “Great Changes Unseen in a Century.”
Yang assesses this development from two perspectives. The failure of the Western order is not just a matter of dynamism in the developing world—the old capitalist powers made specific choices that led them to their present failures. “In the process of industrialization,” Yang argues, “each and every country experiences a keen contradiction between social classes.” Some countries deal with these contradictions by exporting their underclass away through emigration; others deal with them through imperialistic conquest. Historical study suggests that with imperial hegemons "the common rule is that [their] industrial economy moves from real to intangible,” as the financial sector swallows the larger economy and manufacturing is relegated to lesser parts of the imperial world system. The 2008 Financial Crisis revealed just how far down this path the American economy had traveled. Now the United States (and the rest of the Western world with it) can no longer ignore class contradictions intrinsic to their system, for they are expressed in debilitating waves of ethno-nationalism on the one hand, and waves of left-wing populism on the other. The largest casualty in this collapse has been “the power of liberal democracy to rally supporters,” both in the West and outside it.
Yang recognizes that China will soon face the dangerous contradictions of industrial wealth itself, but he is “cautiously optimistic” that China will surmount these difficulties. Yang does not focus on this theme: adding China to the story allows Yang to shift his frame from class contradictions to civilizational conflict. Yang insists that China is not just another capitalist power clamoring for its turn at hegemony over the “Westphalian system of nation states,” but the “core state” of its own “civilizational system.” China’s rise is thus the most important event of the last five centuries. America’s internal contradictions are capable of undermining its leadership of the existing world order; China’s rise “may potentially contribute to the reshaping of the world order” writ large.
Yang does not view this as a clear victory for the Chinese people. Rather, “the great changes” of our era mean that in the realm of international affairs “there is no unifying ideology. Universal values have failed.” Liberal ideals were held up only through liberal power; with the collapse of that power, Yang predicts that the liberal international order of the past will be replaced by a “no man’s land.”
For a party that treats liberal ideas as a mortal danger, this is a tolerable, if not ideal, state of affairs. Yang does not imagine it will be a permanent one. He concludes that “whoever first extricates themselves from ‘no man’s land’ will go on to lead this world.” Yang clearly hopes China will be the ‘first to leave no man’s land,’ but he offers no thoughts on how China might do so. Like many Chinese intellectuals, Yang Guangbin finds it easier to critique the present world order than envision its future.²
—THE EDITORS
https://txtify.it/https://www.strategictranslation.org/articles/how-to-understand-the-great-changes-unseen-in-a-century
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE ‘GREAT CHANGES UNSEEN IN A CENTURY' | THE
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC TRANSLATION
The present [essay] discusses three questions regarding the “Great
Changes Unseen in a Century.”
1. AN IMPORTANT CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS - THE [GLOBAL] SHIFT OF
WEALTH AND POWER.³
At the beginning of the second industrial revolution in 1840, Western
and non-Western nations each accounted for 50% of industrially
manufactured goods. At that time, even though China and India were
very backward, non-Western countries such as these still accounted for
half of the world’s industrially manufactured goods. By 1980,
Western nations supplied 90% of all industrially manufactured goods,
while non-Western countries, including China and India, accounted for
10%. By 2010, non-Western nations, including India, had become the
greatest beneficiaries of globalization and the free flow of capital.
China in particular was an unexpectedly big winner out of this
process. As of 2010, Western nations accounted for 60% of manufactured
goods and non-Western countries accounted for 40%. By 2050 – or
perhaps even earlier – these [relative] proportions may be reversed,
with non-Western countries accounting for 60% and Western countries
for 40%. This transfer of wealth and power [away from Western nations]
is advantageous to non-Western nations [such as China].
Wealth and power are concepts of major significance. In the course of
their development, Western nations used a strategy of “one step in,
one step out” to resolve their domestic contradictions. Class
contradiction is both an old concept and a reality. In the process of
industrialization, each and every country experiences a keen
contradiction between social classes. What methods can resolve this
contradiction? To “step in” refers to the use of strategic
pillaging to resolve this problem – [for example], in 1905 Japan and
Russia went head-to-head in war.⁴
What does “step out” refer to? People who can no longer make ends
meet have the option to emigrate. In the 200 years between 1800 and
2000, over 80% of the population of Edinburgh emigrated, leaving less
than 15% of the [original] local population – over 85% of people
upped and left. In the 20 year period from 1900 to 1920, approximately
6 million people – that is, around 20% of Italy’s population of 30
million – emigrated elsewhere, creating [the conditions for the rise
of] Fascism under Mussolini.⁵
The present shift of wealth and power proves the general rule that
hegemonic nations [are bound to] decline. From [the historical
experience of] the Spanish [Empire], to the British[Empire], and now
to the United States, the common rule is that the industrial economy
moves from real to intangible; for example, the Spanish Empire’s
adoption of “silver capitalism” brought about the decline of its
manual industry and the rise of neighboring countries, such as France
and Germany.⁶ At the end of the 19th century, the British Empire
essentially ceded [its domination] of [global] industry to the United
States and Germany. This is [a case of] a shift in wealth
precipitating the decline of a hegemon, a process that cannot be
reversed.
2. CHANGES IN CULTURAL POWER BROUGHT ABOUT BY SHIFTS IN WEALTH
Why did Western nations flourish after the Second World War? Among the
ideological explanations for this are those meant to legitimize
liberal democracy as a political ideology. We can observe the scenario
when wealth and power are absent – this is what has transpired since
the shift in wealth and power that followed 2008 [the global financial
crisis].⁷ Be it in Europe, the U.S. or non-Western nations the
power of liberal democracy to rally supporters has abated.
Newly apparent is the spontaneous resurgence of [two] ideologies: one
is ethno-nationalism, the other is populism. These two phenomena have
not been constructed [deliberately], but have burst forth naturally,
appearing in response to changes in the environment. The term
ethno-nationalism describes a political nation that takes race as its
primary unit. In 16th century Europe, if you asked someone what type
of person they are, they would not say French or German. They would
say Protestant or Catholic – which reflects a religious frame of
reference. Today, following the decline of politicized ideology,⁸
The original ideological ecology has begun to revive. [Resurgent]
ethno-nationalism is rousing a great rabble. The other [resurgent
ideology] is populism, which in its left-wing form is equivalent to
socialism, and in its right-wing form is effectively
ethno-nationalism.
Therefore, world politics has suddenly taken on a drastically
different appearance. There is [now] no unifying ideology. Universal
values have failed. [Their failure] gives rise to an era in which
diverse [political] cultures co-exist side-by-side. There are two
phenomena here: one is a material, the other is cultural.
WHERE GOES THE WORLD?
To summarize my present answer to this question: “no man’s
land.” Those [of us] who study politics maintain a cautiously
optimistic attitude towards China. We are aware of what our domestic
problems and domestic tensions are. For a fairly long time in the
future, the party and government must confront and resolve the dilemma
of settling the tension between power derived from wealth and power
derived from political authority. "If this problem is managed poorly,
there will be trouble. On the assumption that it is managed well, what
will the prospects be for China's future position on the world stage?
Let us cast aside the talk of domestic problems, as we [at this
gathering] are only discussing world politics. Some famous scholars,
such as Samuel Huntington, repeatedly use Lee Kuan Yew’s 1994
judgment that China is one of “history’s largest scale
participants” in their work.⁹ Pretending one can’t see the
significance of [China’s] scale is nonsensical. [China’s] arrival
raises many issues; [indeed], the arrival of “history’s largest
scale participant” may potentially contribute to the reordering of
the world order.
What is this world order? You can say it took 300 years or 500 years
to [take shape], or that our present world order took shape from 1700
onwards. As the world order took shape, there were many wars within
the West that arose because Western participants were vying for
predominance. This is the Westphalian system of nation states formed
in 1648; the present world order is [based on] this same
Western-dominated Westphalian system.¹⁰ It was once dominated by
Britain and now is [dominated] by the U.S.
Over the past 300 years of Western [history], Westerners have been
playing their own game [on their own terms]. Now China has arrived, a
first for a non-Western nation. From the perspective of “the clash
of civilizations,”¹¹ Islamic civilization does not have one core
civilizational state, so does not pose a major threat to Christian
[Western] civilization.¹² In this sense, we truly are facing
“great changes unseen in a century.” In this sense the 'century'
[of the slogan] does not [refer to] "great changes" that occur on a
100 year timescale, but rather on a 300 or 500 year timescale. On the
one hand, these are major changes in a civilizational sense; on
another level, they refer to a difference in institutions and systems,
that is, the difference between the institutions of capitalism and the
institutions of socialism.
One [aspect of the great changes unseen in a century] are found in
civilizational systems and the other is found in institutions. Now
that these [changes] have emerged, the present world order has entered
a “no man’s land.” We do not know where it will go onto. Whoever
can first extricate themselves from “no man’s land” will go on
to lead this world.
³ THE TRANSCRIPT OF YANG'S SPEECH USES THE TWO HOMONYMS, 权力 AND
权利, MEANING "POWER" AND "RIGHTS" RESPECTIVELY, IN SEEMINGLY
INCONSISTENT WAYS. THESE MAY BE A TRANSCRIPTION ERROR. THE TRANSLATOR
HAS USED CONTEXT TO GUIDE THE CHOICE OF TERM THROUGHOUT.
⁴ THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1904-1905 WAS FOUGHT BETWEEN THE
JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN EMPIRES TO SETTLE THEIR CONFLICTING IMPERIAL
AMBITIONS IN MANCHURIA AND KOREA; WITHOUT VICTORY IN THIS WAR, JAPAN
WOULD NEVER HAVE ESTABLISHED AN IMPERIAL PRESENCE IN NORTHWESTERN
CHINA. RUSSIA’S POOR PERFORMANCE AND ULTIMATE DEFEAT IN THE WAR ALSO
CONTRIBUTED TO THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF JANUARY 1905, AN
UPRISING OF THE WORKING CLASSES AGAINST THE TSAR AND THE NOBILITY THAT
WAS A PRELUDE TO THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION OF 1917. YANG MAY BE IMPLYING
THAT THE FAILURE OF RUSSIA’S “STEP IN” POLICY EXACERBATED ITS
SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS AND LED TO REVOLUTION.
⁵ AROUND THE TURN OF THE 19TH CENTURY, ITALIANS, ESPECIALLY IN THE
SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY, WERE FACING DIRE POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT. FROM
1901-1927, ITALY PURSUED A NATIONALIST POLICY OF EMIGRATION UNDER THE
_COMMISSARIATO GENERALE DELL’EMIGRAZION_E, GUIDED IN PART BY THE
BELIEF THAT THE PROBLEM OF ITALY’S UNEMPLOYABLE MASSES COULD BE
TRANSFORMED INTO A NATIONAL RESOURCE. YANG IMPLIES THAT THE RISE OF
THE FASCISTS UNDER MUSSOLINI – RATHER THAN THE RISE OF A SOCIALIST
PARTY – WAS AIDED BY THE EMIGRATION OF VAST NUMBERS OF THE WORKING
CLASS ITALIANS WHO MIGHT HAVE AGITATED FOR SOCIALIST REFORM.
⁶ DURING THE AGE OF DISCOVERY, THE SPANISH EMPIRE ACQUIRED VAST
AMOUNTS OF SILVER FROM ITS NEW WORLD COLONIES IN AMERICA, NOTABLY THE
VICEROYALTY OF PERU AND THE VICEROYALTY OF NEW SPAIN. THE LARGE
INCREASE IN THE SUPPLY OF PRECIOUS METALS AS WELL AS THE SPANISH
EMPIRE’S MISJUDGED POLICIES CREATED PROBLEMS WITH INFLATION AND DEBT
THAT ULTIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE DECLINE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE.
YANG’S DESCRIPTION OF FINANCIALIZATION AS PRELUDE TO DECLINE YANG IS
NEITHER ORIGINAL NOR ESPECIALLY MARXIST. FOR BRIEF A LITERATURE REVIEW
OF THIS THESIS (WHICH WAS FIRST ARTICULATED BY AMERICAN HISTORIANS AT
THE TURN OF THE 20TH CENTURY), COMPLETE WITH DISCUSSION OF IMPERIAL
SPAIN AND BRITAIN, SEE KEVIN PHILLIPS, _WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH_ (NEW YORK: CROWN, 2003), PP.
171-2003.
⁷ CHINESE ANALYSTS HAVE REFERRED TO THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AS THE
BEGINNING OF THE END OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY FOR MORE THAN DECADE. FOR A
PARTICULARLY INFLUENTIAL EXAMPLE, SEE THIS 2009 ESSAY BY YUAN PENG,
NOW PRESIDENT OF CHINA INSTITUTES OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (CICIR), THE THINK-TANK LINKED TO THE MINISTRY OF STATE
SECURITY: 袁鹏 [YUAN PENG],
“金融危机与美国经济霸权：历史与政治的解读”
[“THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND AMERICAN HEGEMONY: INTERPRETING THE
HISTORY AND POLITICS],” 《更新时间》[_RENEWAL TIMES_],
AVAILABLE AT HTTP://WWW.AISIXIANG.COM/DATA/88470.HTML.
⁸ THE IMPLICATION HERE IS THAT THE NORMS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY,
UNLIKE THE MORE ‘NATURAL’ ALTERNATIVES LIKE POPULISM AND
NATIONALISM, ARE AN ARTIFICIAL CONSTRUCT PROMOTED BY THE WEST AND
IMPOSED ON OTHER SOCIETIES SOLELY TO LEGITIMIZE ITS HEGEMONIC POWER.
YANG HAS STATED THIS BELIEF MORE EXPLICITLY IN OTHER PIECES. IN MAY OF
2022 HE ARGUED THAT THE FINANCIAL COST OF RELYING ON “HARD POWER”
TO MAINTAIN HEGEMONY
_IS TOO HIGH FOR A HEGEMON [LIKE THE UNITED STATES], SO IT MUST
SUPPLEMENT IT WITH “SOFT POWER.” …[BUT] THE RULE OF LAW, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE SACROSANCT INVIOLABILITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY ARE [IN
REALITY] JUST A THIN VEIL THAT THEY DRAPED OVER [THEIR DEEDS] AFTER
THE UNITED STATES HAD ALREADY DEVELOPED. AMERICA’S DEVELOPMENT
PROCESS WAS FULL OF SLAUGHTER AND ROBBERY. FOR THE INDIANS WHO DIED IN
GENOCIDE, WHERE WAS THE RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS? WHERE WAS THE
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WHEN THE FORCES OF THE EIGHT-POWER
ALLIANCE LOOTED YUANMINGYUAN?_
霸权国只靠“硬实力”是维持不了霸权的，代价也太大，必须辅助于“软实力”…美国的“软实力”被打回原形，什么法治、人权、私有财产神圣不可侵犯，都是在其发达起来以后挂起来的一层薄薄面纱，其发展过程充满了杀戮、抢劫的强盗行为，对印第安人的种族灭绝哪里有什么法治和人权，八国联军抢掠圆明园哪里讲什么保护财产权?
杨光斌 [YANG GUANGBIN],
俄罗斯人的世纪抗争路与世界秩序的重组 [“THE
RUSSIAN’S CENTURY LONG PATH OF STRUGGLE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF
WORLD ORDER”], 观察 [_GUANCHA.CN_], 2022年05月01日 [5 MAY
2022], AVAILABLE HERE.
⁹ YANG IS LIKELY REFERRING TO LEE KUAN YEW’S FAMOUS INTERVIEW WITH
FAREED ZAKARIA, PUBLISHED IN THE MARCH-APRIL 1994 EDITION OF _FOREIGN
AFFAIRS_, IN WHICH LEE ASKS WHETHER THE WORLD CAN ACCOMMODATE “A
COUNTRY THE SIZE OF CHINA” INTO THE MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND STABILITY. SEE FAREED ZAKARIA, “CULTURE IS DESTINY - A
CONVERSATION WITH LEE KUAN YEW,” _FOREIGN AFFAIRS, _MAR/APR 1994, P.
122.
¹⁰ THE WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM, TRACED BACK TO THE TREATY OF WESTPHALIA
IN 1648 THAT ENDED A CATASTROPHIC PERIOD OF WAR WITHIN EUROPE, IS
TYPICALLY USED BY CHINESE THINKERS AS SHORT-HAND FOR THE WESTERN-LED
WORLD ORDER THAT BENEFITS WESTERN INTERESTS. THE WESTPHALIAN SYSTEM IS
COMMONLY CREDITED FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND
NON-INTERFERENCE THAT CHINA USES RHETORICALLY TO CONTEST U.S. AND
WESTERN POWER POLITICS AND INTERVENTIONISM.
¹¹ YANG TAKES SERIOUSLY THE “CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS” THESIS
FIRST PUBLISHED BY SAMUEL HUNTINGTON IN THE SUMMER 1993 ISSUE OF
_FOREIGN AFFAIRS._ HUNTINGTON OBSERVED A SHIFT IN POWER AWAY FROM THE
WEST AND PREDICTED COMING CIVILIZATIONAL CHALLENGES FROM THE ISLAMIC
CIVILIZATION, UNIFIED BY RELIGION, AND THE CONFUCIAN CIVILIZATION,
CENTERED ON CHINA AND UNIFIED BY COMMON CULTURAL ROOTS. IN THE
AUTHOR’S VIEW, THEN, THE “CHANGES UNSEEN IN A CENTURY” INVOLVE
NOT ONLY RISING GLOBAL WEALTH, BUT A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS BROUGHT
ABOUT BY A RISING CHINA.
¹² IN HUNTINGTON’S PIECE, THE CATEGORY OF “WESTERN
CIVILIZATION” IS BASED ON THE OLDER CATEGORY OF “WESTERN
CHRISTIANITY”—IN ESSENCE, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ITS REFORMATION
OFFSHOOTS. REGIONS WHERE THESE RELIGIONS WERE HISTORICALLY THE MOST
IMPORTANT COMPRISE HUNTINGTON’S “WEST.” ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY IS
CONSIDERED TO BE THE BASIS FOR A DIFFERENT CIVILIZATION.
YANG DESCRIBES THIS CIVILIZATION WITH THE TERM 基督教, WHICH IS
GENERALLY USED ONLY FOR PROTESTANTS (WITH 天主教 REFERRING TO
CATHOLICS). HOWEVER, IN THE CONTEXT OF HUNTINGTON’S PIECE, 基督教
MAPS ONTO THE “CHRISTIANITY” ASSOCIATED WITH WESTERN CIVILIZATION.
____________________________________
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