https://scholars-stage.org/introducing-the-center-for-strategic-translation/
https://summate.it/https://scholars-stage.org/introducing-the-center-for-strategic-translation/
Introducing the Center for Strategic Translation
The Center for Strategic Translation locates, translates, and annotates documents of historic or strategic value that are only available in Chinese.
In the age of Xi Jinping, the tools used to understand communist politics no longer shed light and field surveys are no longer possible.
Translated documents must be presented with an interpretive apparatus to make the authoritativeness and intentions of the document clear.
Introducing the Center for Strategic Translation
• Introduction to the Center for Strategic Translation
• Two problems that face the world of China watching
• sociological (composition of debating China policy has changed)
• methodological (tools relied on to understand communist politics no longer shed light)
• Solution to the problems:
• Read what the Communist Party of China is saying, then take it seriously
• Difficulty with this approach: "party speak" is stilted, opaque, and stuffed with slogans
• Need for fluency in Chinese trained on constant diet of propaganda
• Need for extensive study of party history
• Solution to this difficulty:
• Introductory essays to make translated documents clear
• Glossary to explain origin, historical use, and current meaning of political terms
https://txtify.it/https://scholars-stage.org/introducing-the-center-for-strategic-translation/
A general introduction to this round-table and the “great changes”
phrase can be found here. I encourage you to read all six entries. The
most interesting, in my opinion, was written by Xie Tao, a Beijing
“America expert” who got a PhD in American politics from
Northwestern in the aughts. In “From the Rise of Populism to the
Return of History” Xie argues that: “All tides that rise must
fall. All living men must age, sicken, and die. Therefore, the United
States must accept that the day will come where it too will fall into
decline.”3
Xie divides recent Western history into three big chunks: the boom
years that followed the Great Depression and lasted through the 1970s,
the Neoliberal era, which end with the Great Recession, and the
current period, the era of right wing populism. He expects this era to
“continue for ten or twenty more years.” This is completely in
line with the other round table respondents, who are all convinced
that right-wing populism is both a sign of American decline and the
inevitable outcome of neoliberal excess. The respondents generally
describe Trump’s rise as a transition point in American politics.
Trump revealed the bankruptcy of liberalism even in its birthland.
Some of the participants–like Yang Guangbin–believe that
liberalism was _always _bankrupt, an artificial ideology weaponized by
Westerners to shore up their domestic politics and to subject
foreigners to their political control. Xie is not that cynical. He
sees the failure of liberalism as a _chosen _by liberals themselves:
> Another explanation for the appearance of right-wing populism is as
> a response to the rise of identity politics, or, perhaps more
> accurately, as a fierce revolt against the gradual shift since the
> 1970s toward what has been called “post-materialist values.” To
> summarize this idea briefly, two decades of postwar economic
> prosperity led many young people in the West to place less
> importance on material stability than the expression of their
> values. These post-materialist values include personal liberty,
> freedom to choose one’s own sexual orientation, civil rights
> crusades, political correctness, protecting the environment,
> promoting human rights, and so forth. In the United States, the
> Democratic Party has become a bastion for identity politics, with
> the majority of their supporters being drawn from ethnic and sexual
> minority groups.
>
> THE TRAGEDY OF IDENTITY POLITICS IS THAT IT PRIORITIZES CALLS FOR
> RESPECT AND SELF-EXPRESSION OVER DEMANDS FOR MORE CONVENTIONAL
> ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION. The reality is that the vast majority of
> average citizens care more about their economic interests than the
> right of a small minority to use a certain bathroom. A backlash
> against these values and rising economic inequality combined to
> cause a surge in right-wing populism, and it also contributed to the
> Democratic Party’s electoral loss in 2016.4
The implication here is that if the left has remained focused on its
traditional economic mission, we would live in an age defined by left
wing populism, not its reactionary counterpart.
Above this tale of competing populisms is a larger story of hubris and
decline. Xie thinks that Americans truly believe in liberal
shibboleths–and that this blinds them from seeing their own decline.
America is a country that no longer has state capacity; it cannot
govern. If Americans had studied history they would realize that they
are playing out the same story of rise and decline as so many empires
in days past.
The Americans do not realize what is happening, however, because they
believe they are “exceptional.” American ideology stops Americans
from recognizing the reality of decline–much less diagnosing its
true causes. They must find a scapegoat for their sinking fortunes.
“This is the reason,” Xie concludes, “why the Sino-American
relationship is at its lowest ebb since Richard Nixon’s visit in
1972.”5
I encourage you to read the entire THING. I also encourage you to sign
up for the CST substack or follow the CST twitter to keep up with what
we publish in the future.
https://summate.it/https://scholars-stage.org/introducing-the-center-for-strategic-translation/
Introducing the Center for Strategic Translation
The Center for Strategic Translation locates, translates, and annotates documents of historic or strategic value that are only available in Chinese.
In the age of Xi Jinping, the tools used to understand communist politics no longer shed light and field surveys are no longer possible.
Translated documents must be presented with an interpretive apparatus to make the authoritativeness and intentions of the document clear.
Introducing the Center for Strategic Translation
• Introduction to the Center for Strategic Translation
• Two problems that face the world of China watching
• sociological (composition of debating China policy has changed)
• methodological (tools relied on to understand communist politics no longer shed light)
• Solution to the problems:
• Read what the Communist Party of China is saying, then take it seriously
• Difficulty with this approach: "party speak" is stilted, opaque, and stuffed with slogans
• Need for fluency in Chinese trained on constant diet of propaganda
• Need for extensive study of party history
• Solution to this difficulty:
• Introductory essays to make translated documents clear
• Glossary to explain origin, historical use, and current meaning of political terms
https://txtify.it/https://scholars-stage.org/introducing-the-center-for-strategic-translation/
A general introduction to this round-table and the “great changes”
phrase can be found here. I encourage you to read all six entries. The
most interesting, in my opinion, was written by Xie Tao, a Beijing
“America expert” who got a PhD in American politics from
Northwestern in the aughts. In “From the Rise of Populism to the
Return of History” Xie argues that: “All tides that rise must
fall. All living men must age, sicken, and die. Therefore, the United
States must accept that the day will come where it too will fall into
decline.”3
Xie divides recent Western history into three big chunks: the boom
years that followed the Great Depression and lasted through the 1970s,
the Neoliberal era, which end with the Great Recession, and the
current period, the era of right wing populism. He expects this era to
“continue for ten or twenty more years.” This is completely in
line with the other round table respondents, who are all convinced
that right-wing populism is both a sign of American decline and the
inevitable outcome of neoliberal excess. The respondents generally
describe Trump’s rise as a transition point in American politics.
Trump revealed the bankruptcy of liberalism even in its birthland.
Some of the participants–like Yang Guangbin–believe that
liberalism was _always _bankrupt, an artificial ideology weaponized by
Westerners to shore up their domestic politics and to subject
foreigners to their political control. Xie is not that cynical. He
sees the failure of liberalism as a _chosen _by liberals themselves:
> Another explanation for the appearance of right-wing populism is as
> a response to the rise of identity politics, or, perhaps more
> accurately, as a fierce revolt against the gradual shift since the
> 1970s toward what has been called “post-materialist values.” To
> summarize this idea briefly, two decades of postwar economic
> prosperity led many young people in the West to place less
> importance on material stability than the expression of their
> values. These post-materialist values include personal liberty,
> freedom to choose one’s own sexual orientation, civil rights
> crusades, political correctness, protecting the environment,
> promoting human rights, and so forth. In the United States, the
> Democratic Party has become a bastion for identity politics, with
> the majority of their supporters being drawn from ethnic and sexual
> minority groups.
>
> THE TRAGEDY OF IDENTITY POLITICS IS THAT IT PRIORITIZES CALLS FOR
> RESPECT AND SELF-EXPRESSION OVER DEMANDS FOR MORE CONVENTIONAL
> ECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION. The reality is that the vast majority of
> average citizens care more about their economic interests than the
> right of a small minority to use a certain bathroom. A backlash
> against these values and rising economic inequality combined to
> cause a surge in right-wing populism, and it also contributed to the
> Democratic Party’s electoral loss in 2016.4
The implication here is that if the left has remained focused on its
traditional economic mission, we would live in an age defined by left
wing populism, not its reactionary counterpart.
Above this tale of competing populisms is a larger story of hubris and
decline. Xie thinks that Americans truly believe in liberal
shibboleths–and that this blinds them from seeing their own decline.
America is a country that no longer has state capacity; it cannot
govern. If Americans had studied history they would realize that they
are playing out the same story of rise and decline as so many empires
in days past.
The Americans do not realize what is happening, however, because they
believe they are “exceptional.” American ideology stops Americans
from recognizing the reality of decline–much less diagnosing its
true causes. They must find a scapegoat for their sinking fortunes.
“This is the reason,” Xie concludes, “why the Sino-American
relationship is at its lowest ebb since Richard Nixon’s visit in
1972.”5
I encourage you to read the entire THING. I also encourage you to sign
up for the CST substack or follow the CST twitter to keep up with what
we publish in the future.
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